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La S ERHAPS Andy’s most impor-tant and lasting con-
tribution to the economics pnofession was his r-e-
seam-ch with Jerry Jom-dan that mesulted in the publica-
tion ofthe Andersen-Jordan (A-Jl equation on’, as it is
more widely known, the St. Louis equation. Almost
immediately, the two found their- wor’k the subject of
intense c-r-iticismn and contr’over-sy — mmmcli of which
continues, though in tones that am-c significantly
muted.’
While the criticisms of Andersen-Jom-dan wer-e fo-
cused on various technical and applied econometric
aspects of their work, they wer-e motivated, in lan-ge
part, by A-J’s conclusion that monetary policy has a
significant and lasting effect on nominal GNP and that
fiscal policy has no lasting effect. These results con-
flicted sharply not only with the conventional wisdom
about the relative effects of monetary and fiscal policy
actions but with the results oflarge-scale econometric
models of the time.
The ptrrpose ofthis paper is to r-eview thecn-iticisms
that emer’ged following the publication of the A—J
equation.< We note that many, if not all, of the cr-iti—
cisms of the A-J paper- apply equally well to the vast
majority of published research, then arid now. More
importantly, using the original A-J data, we find no
evidence to suppor-t these cn-iticisms.
Dallas S. Batten and Daniel L. Thornton are research officers at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Rosemarie V. Mueller provided
research assistance.
‘The monetary-fiscal policy debate was actually initiated prior to
Andersen-Jordan (1968) by Friedman and Meiselman (1963). Just
as the ensuing debate surrounding Friedman and Meiselman’s
results was waning, however, Andersen and Jordan appeared,
rekindling and intensifying the disagreement over the relative effi-
cacyof monetary and fiscal policies.
2While our review differs from recent ones byMcCallum (1986) and




Recently, Cooley and LeRoy (19811 have ar-gued that
a close cor-respondence tends to exist between the
advocacy ofatheory and ther-esults ofscientific inves-
tigation. It is not sum-prising, therefon’e, that when two
known and vocal proponents of monetarism r-epon-ted
empirical r-esults that strongly suppom-ted monetarst
propositions, the results were received with skepti-
cism, which was intensified by theim- use of a single,
“n-educed-for-ni” equation. Critics were suspicious that
A-i inadvertently had either- misspecified the model or
used faulty econometric techniques to obtain their
results.’
Three major criticisms emerged following the ptrbli-
cation ofthe A-Jequation. Fir-si, it was ar-gtred than the
equation was misspecified because impon’tant exoge-
nous, r-ight-hand-side variables had been excluded.
Second, critics claimed that A—J’s use ofon-dinany least
squares (OLS)had resulted in sinrultaneotms equation
bias. Finally, it was asserted that A-J had failed to
identify the relevant exogenous indicator-s of mone-
tary and fiscal policy actions. tmr addition, critics wene
concerned that theA-J m’esolts were sample-specific or
not robust to various econometn-rc modifications, in-
cluding their use of Almnon’s (1965) polynomial distmib—
uted lagestimation technique. The perception that A-J
had somehow erred was enhanced when de Leeuw
and Kalchbrenner (1969), Silber (1971( and Schmidt
and Waud (19731 tried unsuccessfully to n-eplicate the
3A number of critiques appeared very shortly after the publication of
the A-J paper, e.g., de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner (1969), Davis
(1969), Corrigan (1970), and Goldteld and Blinder (1972).
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A—i n-esults.~ The following sections examine these cr-it—
icismns.
S ,,-< <, -‘
The c-liar-ge that A—i had misspecified them’equation
by omitting inipor-tanit variables, other than monetary
and fiscal policy vam-iatrles, was leveled 1w numer-ous
commentator-s. To understand this an’gn.nment, con-
sider- the or-iginal A-Jequation:
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where Y, M and E denote nomimial GNP, the money
stock (Ml ( and nominal high-employment gover’n-
merit expenditun-es, r-espectively, and u, denotes the
usual m-andom distur-bamtce ter’m.5 This equation can he
wr-itten mor-e compactly as:
(2) Ax’, a + f3ILIAM, + y(IJAE, +
where ~U( and -‘jUl are polynomials in the lag open-a—
tor U, such that L”x, = l,x,,, and where ~UlAx, ar-c
distributed lags ofafinite on-der k.’ A-i chose k = 3.
lfarelevant exogenous policy variable, Z,, is omitted,
the tnue specification is riot eqtration 2, but
3) Ax’, = a + ~IL)AM, + y(L)AE, + 6)IJAZ, + ms
in which case the en-i-or’ term in equation 2 is u,
a(L(Az, + ~,. Fum-ther-rtior’e, estimates of the riiorietaiy
amid fiscal policy r’esponises from equation 2 will he
biased ifAZ, is c-or-related with AM, or AE,.
Tins criticism of the A—J equation, while potentially
damaging if valid, applies equally well to vim’tually all
41t now appears that these differences resulted from differences in
programming or in the imposition of polynomial restrictions. Batten
and Thornton (1985) have replicated the A-Jresults to the second or
third decimal place. Even thoughother researchers may have been
unable to replicate the A-J results exactly, their studies generally
supported the qualitative findings of A-J.
‘The original A-J paper also contained specifications with the ad-
justed monetary base as the indicator of monetary policy actions
and a distributed lag of high-employment government revenues as
an additional right-hand-side variable. Equation I is the mostcom-
monly estimated form of the equation, however.
Furthermore, following an exchange between Friedman (1977)
and Carlson (1978), the equation was specified in growth rates of
the variables. It is interesting to note that A-J also estimated a
growth-rate specification, but only reported the first-difference
results. For the most part, the issues discussed betow are indepen-
dent of thespecification.
applied econonietr-ic r-esear-ch, including most lan-ge—
scale, sinimsrltaneous—equation econome tr-ic models of
the A—i vnitage! Moreover’, although it was conimotilv
ar-gired that the A—i equation was potentially misspeci-
fled, econometric theory does not suggest that it is
more susceptible to the r-esulting bias than other’ esti-
mated equations. Indeed, there was no evrdence that
their results were biased since no tests for’ rriisspecili—
cation were per-for-mired.
While their r’esmrltsprovided no evidence that the A-i
equation is misspecified, Modigliani and Ando (19761
presented evidence fi’om a Monte Carlo-style experi-
ment that led sonic to doubt the validity of the A-i
results.’ Using ar-tificial data gener-ated by the MPS
economnetr’ic nrodel, they used a St. Louis-style equa-
tion to estimate the reduced-fom-m pam-anieters. The
results indicated that the St. Louis-style equation pr-o-
duced poor- estimates of the “true” mnonetary and
fiscal multiplier’s, seriously over-stating the size of the
monetary influence and under-estimating the magni-
tude of the fiscal policy effect. ‘l’hey concluded that
the A-J reduced-for-m estimation technique yielded
unreliable estimates.
This conclusion, however-, is imnwar-r-anted;’ tf a
7For example, Duesenberry et al. (1965).
‘See McCallum (1986), p. 17 and footnote 16.
‘McCallum (1986) criticized the Modigliani-Ando results by arguing
that they failed to distinguish between reduced-form and “final-
form”multipliers. He considers thecase where 2Z~ = a, + a iSY,
+ a2iXM, + a,,~E, + me,. Substituting this expression into equa-
tion 3 yields the following: ~Y, = ~ A f3’(L)AM, -r y’(L)AE, 4- 5
where the coefficients are defined to conform, e.g., p’(L) =
[I .~.La,5(L)] -‘ fli(L) * La,8(L)]. In contrast to the finite order distrib-
uted lagsof the A-Jequation 2, the distributed lags on this final-form
equation are of an infinite order. Also, the error term of the A-J
equation, u,, is hypothesized to be white noise, while that of the
above equation, 5, is an infinite order AR process under the as-
sumption about u,, The distinction between reduced-and final-form
equations may not be important, however, because if the lags of the
final-form equation are truncated to match those of equation 2,
these equations are indistinguishable save theerrorstructure. While
this difference will allow one to distinguish between the two equa-
tions, it will only do so if one is willing to make strong claims about
the underlying distribution of u. (McCallum notes this; see p. 24,
footnote8).
It is interesting to note, however, that our results obtained by
adding a distributed lag of ~Y to the A-J equation support McCaI-
lum’s idea that the A-J results reflect all of the direct and indirect
effects via lagged values of nominal GNP. A-J and Darby (1976)
argued that the equation captured direct and indirect effects via
othercontemporaneous endogenous variables.
McCallum also argues correctly that “it is hard to imagine any
important macroeconomic variable that is truly exogenous ...“ (p.
13). If there are really no exogenous variables, however, then the
true reduced form would be a Sims-type VARmodel where the only
exogenous variables would be the policy and, perhaps, other
innovations,
‘The notation used here is the same as employed by McCallum
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str’uctirr-al model is well defined with additive, nor-—
mnallv distributed en-r-or-s, consistent estimates of the
r-edum:ed—fon-m parameter-s can be obtained by the use
of indirect least squares, a Ia A—J.” Because the Mt’S
model does not miecessanly neflec:tthe tr-ue structur-e
ofthe U.S. economy (for’ example, it ignores potentially
irupor-tant sour-c-es of crowding out thirougli wealth
effects and Ricar’diari equivalencel, the Modighani—
Amido exper-iniient cannot he a cr-iticisnii of the A—i
results or’ of the A—i methodology.’’ Consequemitly, the
Modigliani—Ando e~idence is predominantly a state—
merit about Keynesian vs. mnonetarist views of the
won~ld.2Fur-them-mon-c, they provide no general infom—
mation concer-nimng the useflulness of the n-educed—
fon-m estimation. By design, the A-i equation did riot
conform to the n-educed for-m ofthe MPS model; so it is
riot sur-pn-ising that the par-amneter’ estimates wen-e
poor. The experiment merely reminds us that, if one
estimates a r-educed form that is known to be mnisspe-
cified, the results may be biased.
(:IO/’Ak//rS L/Nr.uC~/ice
Except for- the usual checks for’ serial c-or-n-elation
ant heter-oskedasticity, the A—i equation was riot sub-
jected to formal tests of model specification. Gordon
(1976) came closest to testing the A—i equation for mis—
specification. Fle added aset of ‘‘omitted variables,’’ Z,
to theSt.louis equation. Claiming that these variables
wer’e nomistochastic, lie tested for their’ statistical sig—
nificance amid mneasut-ed the impact of these variables
on the A—J equation simply 1wobserving whether’ the~’
affected the size and statistical significance of the
estimnated long—n-un monetary and usc-al miiultipliers.
Unfom-tum’rately, the Z—var’iable lie constructed — the
sumn of net exports, consumer expenditures on new
automobiles arid nonresidential fixed investment —
was an-guahly muon-c endogenous than the money arid
“Unique estimates of the structural parameters cannot be obtained,
however, unless the system is exactly identified.
“Klein (1976), p-So, noted in his discussion of the Modigliani-Ando
paper, “If the world were constructed along tines portrayed by the
MPS model, St. Louis conclusions could have been innocently
obtained by one whodid not bother to estimate the structure-This is
the strongest statement that can be made,”
‘2Gordon (1976) chides Schwartz (1976) for missing the point of the
Modigliani-Ando critique because she criticizes the specification of
the MPS model. But this is exactly the point. Gordon later states
incorrectly that “the major contribution of the paper is its demonstra-
tion that the correlation between included policy variables and other
excluded variables severely biases the estimated St. Louismultipli-
ers and renders useless the reduced torm technique” (p. 60).
expenditure variables that A—i had used. Hence, Gor--
don’s results, while by arid lan-ge tavon-able to A—i, say
little about whether A-J’s r-esults were atiected by
specification errorS.”
‘‘/~/‘4/.+/~c~’4/Nt*’
Ideally, one should test the specification ofa model
by companng it with awell-specified alter-native. Since
the reduced for-ni of the MPS model (or any other’
lam-ge-scale Keynesian model) is well specified, it
could, in principle, be used as the alter-native in a test
of the A-i equation. Unfortunately, most large-scale
models have too many exogenous vamiables for- the
r-educed for-m to be estimated directly. Even ifit could
be estimated directly, however, it would be difficult to
obtain a data set that is contparably dated with the
original A-Jdata.
This has prompted us to use a genen-al test of mis-
specification, the RESET’ test of Ramsey and Schmidt
(1976), which requires no additional data. The RESET
test is agem’ieral diagnostic test forvarious types ofmis-
specifications, including omitted variables. where the
alter-native hypothesis is riot well specified.” Applied
to equation 2, the F-statistic calculated according to
the Ramsey-Schmidt version of the RESE’t’ test is .52,
which is not significant at the S pen-cent levels Hence,
the RESET test pr-ovides rio suppor’t fon claims that the
origirial A-i equation was misspecified because A-i
had omitted significant exogenous variables froniu
their’ analysis.
‘2Gordon performed no formal tests. He noted merely that, when his
Z-variable was included, the sum of coefficients on AM became
smallerand, during one short period, was insignificant. (This period
is the one for which the correlation between AM, and AM,,,, and his
composite variable is the highest.) There was no discussion, how-
ever, of the problem of munticollinearity or possible bias induced by
including variables that are clearly endogenous. (If these extrane-
ousvariables do not belong in the model, the estimates are consist-
ent but may be biased in smallsamples.)
“In general, if an equation is misspecified, the residuals will have a
non-zero mean. The RESET test is designed to detect a non-zero
mean of the residuals. Thetest is performed by adding Ax”, Ax”
Ax” asadditional regressors to equation 2 and testing the hypothe-
ses that these regressors have no joint effect on the dependent
variable, The test here was performed for h ~“ 2,3,4; the result with
the lowestsignificance level (in this case, h 3) is reported. See
Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984), pp.411—12, for a discussion of the
RESET test.
“When A-J originallyestimated equation 2, they used restricted least
squares in the form of Almon’s (1965) polynomial distributed lag
estimation technique.We have recently shown, however, that none
of the important conclusions of A-J depend on these restrictions
lBatten and Thornton (1985)]. Consequently, all of the empirical
results reported here are obtained with OLS.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUIS OCTOBER 1985 N
A ruumber’of critics ar-gued that the A-i r-esults wer-e
unreliable because their policy variables were riot
strictly exogeruous. 13cc-arise of their’ knowledge of the
issues stirroundinig tan-gets arid indicaton-s of riuonetary
policy, A—i were acutely awam’e of the need to select
exogenous indicator-s of policy. Indeed, they comisid-
ered a bm-oad range ofruueasures of monetary arid fiscal
actions that had been cited fl-elfuenthy in the liter-a—
ture.’ In their-analysis, they assumed that all excluded
variables eithiem’ were inidependent of monetary and
fiscal actiomis or- wer-e influenced by thieruu, so that
monetary and fiscal policies exen-ted aru indir-ect effect
on the economy thunoughi these factor-s.” A-i r-easoned
that if monetary and fiscal influences wet-c not inude—
pendent of other factor-s, the constant ter-m, which
they am’gued summan-ized the iruipact of these factor’s,
would have changed as these variables changed. Using
a Chow test to test whuetlier- the parameten-s of their-
equatiomi were tempor-ahlv stable, they found rio evi-
dence of instability.
Given the attention that A-i gave to this issue, it is
odd that their won-k was singled out as subject to
simultaneous equation bias, when a nuriuber ofwor’ks
of applied economics of this virutage were not criti-
cized fon- applying OLS to equations with might—liarud—
side variables that wem-e more clear-ly erudogenuous.”
Again, despite claims that the A—J results were ques-
tionable omu gr-ouruds of simultaneity, systeruuatic test—
irig for simultaneous equation bias luas beer’r sparse.
McCallunu (1986) compar-ed OLS amid inst r’umental
variables llV) estimriates of the A—i equation, but per-—
formed rio for-mah tests. Extending Mccallum’s analy-
sis, we penfornu a Wu (19731 test using the original A—J
data. Like McCalhtnni, we used thuree lags of AM, AE
arid the thiree—nuonth ‘l’r’easum’v bill r’ate as instruments
for- AM, arud AE,.The results am-c m-epon-ted in table 1.
Table 1





‘Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
Absolute value oft-ratio in parentheses
A comparison of OhS and IV estiniates shows sonire
Ian-ge differences, par’ticulan-l,v for the coefficiemuts omi
AM, anud AE,. The IV estimates show a smnaller’ initial
effect of motley arid a lan-ger’ iruitial effect of govern—
merit expenditur-es relative to the GUS estimates, Nev—
er-thueless, thue Wtn tesl chi—squar-e statistic is .20, not
statistically significant at the S perc emit level.
It is not too surprising that the IV est i muia tes ar-e
r-elativelv iruipt-ecise. the first—stage ft’s wer-e.54 and .38
for AM, arud A K,, respectively. Moreover, the ftc t that
three lags of ~M, amid Al-;, are used as insrrunuuents
means that AKl, and Aft, ar-e likely to be higlulv c-or-re-
lated with the other n-egr’essor-s of the A—.l equatio mu -
While the test could be carried on t with alter-native
instruments, there is no obvious guide to their selec-
tion - tn any event, it is urulikeiv tluat thue rest Its will he




AM, , 0.312 1 652
(0.32) (0 84)
AM, 2.696 2.005
(2 69) (1 56)














Joint F test, AM 1584 865
Joint F-test AE 3.17’ 2.75’
0.61 0.54
OW 1 747 2.010
5 396 4.42
“Both Andersen and Jordan participated in a Conference on Indica-
tors and Targets otMonetary Policy held at UCLA in 1966. Andersen
contributedto theconference proceedings; see Andersen (1969).
“This possibility was alsoconsidered by McCallum (1986) and Darby
(1976), though McCallum included a lagged dependent variable to
obtain his distinction between the reduced form and the final form;
seefootnote 9 above.
“One of the most important of these was Chow’s (1966) pathbreaking
work on money demand, in which current values of real GNP and a
nominal interest rate appeared on the right-hand side of the
equation.}~-/ ~
Table 2
Estimates of an Autoregressive Version
of the Andersen-Jordan Equation
Variable Coefficient V-ratio
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ning flom money to inconue arid bidin-ectiotual causal-
ity between expenditures arid inucome?’ More r-eceruthy,
using the original A—i data, Batten amid Thor’nton (1985)
found unidin-ectionah causality running fnonuu monueyto
income and no causal ordering between incomne and
expendit ut-es.
The fact that mconue (foes not Gn-anuger—cause
money implies Iluat the coeffucieruts on the distr-ibuted
lag of AM, do riot reflect the feedback of imicome on
itself via ruuoney; instead, thuese coefficients measur-e
the dir-cc-I, and possibly indin-ect, citec-Is of monuey on
the economy. ‘ho verifr this interpr’etation, a three-
quarter distnibjuted lag of AY was included mu the A—i
equation asseparate regressors and the significance of
these coefficients was tested. ‘Flue resuhts am-c r’epor-ted
in table 2. The coefficiemuts on the lags of the depen-
dent variable are riot significantly different fioruu zero
— irudividuahhy or- jointly. Furthermore, the coet-
licients on the nuoney and expenditure variables differ’
little fl-our the OhS results of table 1.
~itms LvkWrwe
Although his criticismn was not dir-cc-ted explicitly at
the A-i equation, Sims (1980,1982) huas ar-gued n-ecenthy
that the impact of monetary policy actions is very
small if intenest nates are included in the same equa-
tion.2’ To investigate Sinus’ conjecture, we added a
contenupon-aneous and thn-ee-quar-ter-distributed lagof
the change in the thn-ee—motith Treasury bill n-ate (ATBI
to the A-i equation.”’t’he n-esults, m’epom-ted in table 3,
sluow thuat only thue conitempon-aneous coefiucierut on
SIB is significant. Mon-cover’, the coefficients oru the
money and expenditure vaniables are little changed
fr-onu those in table 1, and none of the qualitative
conclusions about thue effectiveness of nuionetaiy on-
fiscal policy actions is altered.
‘l’hns, as was thecase for-allegations ofmisspecifica-
tionu, then-c is consider-able dispanity betweenu the con-
ventional wisdom and the enuupirical results concern-
ing the issue of simultaneity. Neven-thueless, thue claim
that sinuultaneity is a serious problemu for the A—i
equation is a deeply entn-enched anud widely accepted
“Elliott used Sims’ (1972) procedure which requires that the data be
filtered, a process that can affect the test results. See Feige and
Pearce (1979).
“McCallum (1983. 1986) has critiqued Sims’ results on theoretical
grounds.
“The equation was also estimated with the levelof the Treasury bill
rate; however, none of the qualitative conclusions were changed.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1986 •
criticism of their- work:’ The evidence exanuined in
this section, however-, suggests that estimatioru of the
originalA-i equation was not affected by simultaneity.
/
A thim-d major criticism of the St. Louis equation was
that A-i’s indicators of policy actions may be inappr-o-
priate. Failure to use appropniate indicator-s could bias
the estimated par-ameters, perhaps by distorting the
relative importance ofmonetary and fiscal actionus.”
in a sense, this argument is an extension of the
policy endogeneity amgument since its proponents
contended that the appropr-iate indicator ofnuonetary
policy should not respond endogenously to forces
outside of the Fed’s control. For- exanuple, in the first
published criticism of A-J, de Leeuw and Kalchbren-
ncr (1969) criticized the use ofthe monetary base (and
implicitly Ml) as an indicator- of monetany policy
actions on the grounds that some of its components
(particularly, currency and borrowed reserves) were
endogenous and not controlled by the Fed directly.”
instead, de Leeuw and Icalchbrenner offer-cd an alter-
native exogenous policy measure that they obtained
by subtnacting cun-r-ency and bon-m-owings fn-om the ad-
justed nuonetamy base~.When they estiniated an A-i
type equation using their- measure ofmonetary policy
actions, they found the cutuiulative nuonetary polic
multiplien was much snualler than that of the A-i
equation and not significantly diffen-ent floruu zero. On
the other- hand, their’ estinuated cumulative govem-n-
ment spending multiplier wassubstantially lar-ger amid
was statistically significant.”
in their reply, A-J (1969) pointed out that de Leeuw
and Kalchbr-enner-’s focus on therises of tIm ruuonetary
base was inappropriate. Although the banks and the
public deter-mine the uses ofthe base, the Fed conutr-ols
the size of the nuuonetary base thrmnnghu its irufluetuce
over the sources of the base, tlue lar-gest conuiponient of
“While Andersen and Jordan acknowledged that money could be
endogenously related to income and expenditure variables via a
Fed reaction function,” they considered this to be of little practical
significance. See Andersen and Jordan (1969), p. 16.
“For some, the concern was that some of the effect of fiscal policy
might be incorrectly attributed to monetary policy. See Blinder and
Solow (1974).
“This line ofargument was also taken by Gramfich (1971).
“Government receipts were also included; the estimated cumulative
multiplier ofgovernment receipts also increasedbut was statistically
significant onlywith longer lags.
Table 3
Estimates of the Andersen-Jordan
Equation with a Distributed Lag of
Interest Rates
Lags AM ATB AE
0 2409 4.216’ 0313
130/) (2 37r 11 17)
0633 0172 0.639’
(061) 006) (232)
2 2.124 0199 0002
m2.00) (0 10) 1001)
3 0.737 0t22 Q666’
(0 791 (0 07) 12 47)
Sum 4.637’ 4415 0.228
(4.95) (1 39) 1094)
Conisfanh 2.910
(3 47)
Jornt I--!est. AM 7 65’
Jorntr test. AIB 1 96




iridrcales stahrsrrcar smgnrtrcance at the S perceptleve:
Absolute value of the t-rat,o rn parentheses
which is the F’ed’sholdings of U.S. government securi-
ties.Thus, the F’ed determines the size ofthe monetary
base thr-ough its sales or punthases of gover-nmenut
securities.
Fun-thuer-mnore, A—i noted that chanuges in the Ml
money stock during their estinuation period wer-e
dominated by changes imi the nuuonetany huase. 1-terice,
the F’ed exercised corutrol oven’ MI throughu its control
of thue sources of thue monetary base. Since this cx—
change, the disagr-eenuuent over the mneasur’emuuent of
nuuonetary policy actions has subsided, and the muuone—
tary base and NIl (and, at tiruues, broader ruuoruetary
aggn’egates) are geruer-ahIv accepted, anud commonly
used, as indicators of policy actions.
A—J‘s measur-ernerut of fiscal policy actiorus was cinti
cized more thatu tlueir measure of nmonretar-v pohic
actiomus. tlecognnzirug that cerRuru coruiporuents of botlu
federal goven-nument expenditun’es and rcyeniues re—
spond erudogenousiv to the level of ecoruoruuicactivity,
A—i utilized luiglu—enuuplovruuemut measun’es, wluicbu were
adjusted for these inhluemuces. tJe I eeuw armd Kahchu—FE5~ERAi’4E5ERV7’,ianr~05 57. WWS
bnennem’ contended that thuis adjustnuent was inconu—
phete tuecause it failed to elinuuinate the influence of
infhation. TIne substitution of irufiation—adjusted, high—
employment goven-nment expenditures and m’evenues,
however-, had little impact on the estimated fuaranue—
ten-s of the equation.
Gnanuhich (1971) felt that the non—monetary exoge—
nuoims” irufluences wen-e too narrowly defined. Conse-
quently, he constr-ucted two tun’oader composite inca—
sun-es. His expenditun-e measure was government
purchases plus exports, gr-ants-in-aid arid an inven-
tory adjustnuent for defense purchases. His revenue
measur-e included higlu-employment per-sonal taxes
plus interest pavnuents and social security contribu-
tions less exogenous tn-anusfems (that is, all tn-anst’ers
except unemployment compensation). While these
changes did r-esuht in larger- (and mon-c nearly statisti-
cally significant) sunus ofestimated coefficients for- the
non-monetary influences, the gener-al r-esults of A-i
remained intact.
Cor’rigan (1970) often-ed whuat appear-ed to be the
most damaging cr-iticism of the buigh-emphoyment
measun-es of fiscal policy actions. He argued tluat they
did not represent appropniate iiudicators of discre-
tionany fiscal policy actions, since high—employruuent
nueasures especially n-eyenues) would change with
highi-enuployruuent incoruue. Iru thuein place, he offered
lus initial stimulus 1151 nueasur-e of discr-etionary
changes in fiscal policy.The IS nuueasun-e ofgover-nnuuent
expendntun’es did not tufter’ significantly frtm thue highu—
enuployruuent nueasur-e. ‘[hue IS nuueasure ofrevenues, on
thue otluer- harud, differed corusider-aluhv fn-om its huighu
enupho~rnuentcornnter-par-t. In pam-ticulan-, the IS mea-
sure of acluange iru gover-nntient r’evenues was nonzero
only in quarter-s in which ataxwas irutroduced, moth—
fled, suspended or’eliminated.
Whuen iS nueasinr-es wen-e sulustituted for’ high—
employment mtueasures in an A—i type equation, the
results were stan-thing: the estimated cunuulative iruu—
pact of chuaruges in Ml declined, while those of bothu
changes in goven-nment exlueruclitunes anti of charuges
in government r-evenues nose significantly and, mon-c
impon-tanthv, were apparently statistically significant.”
‘thus, Conrigani concluded that fiscal policy actions
huad a meaningful impact on norunnah ecoruomic
activity.
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Subsequently, however-, Schmidt and Waud (1973)
found that Con’rigan’s results depended critically on
the polynomial r-estrictions he imposed.’8 When these
restrictions, which appear-cd to be rejected by the
data, were relaxed, Schmidt arid VVaud obtained
results with the IS measur-es that were similar to A-i’s.
The evidence suggests that A-i’s results coneer-ning
the effect offiscal policy were not cnitically dependent
on their- measurenuent of monetary or fiscal policy
actions. Meyer and Rasche (1980) summan’ized their
investigation of this issue by noting that, ‘the modi-
fications suggested ... have not genen-ally resulted in
dramatic changes inthe estimated multipliers in sun-
pIe reduced-fon’m equations.”
~ -
To estimate their dynamic specification, A-J used
Ahmon’s (1965) polynomial distributed lag estimation
technique that was designed to improve the pnecision
of the estimated parameter-s of a distributed-hag
model. The technique constn-ains the paranneter-s of
each distributed hag to lie on a polynomial of a given
degree. Perhaps because relatively little was known
about the procedure when A-i pubhishued their paper-,
critics contended that the A-i results might hue depen-
dent upon, on- at least sensitive to, their- choice of hag
length or polynomial degr-ee:”
There huave been relatively few investigations of this
aspect of the A-i equation. The tuest-known study by
Schmidt and Waud (1973), as well as others by Coni-
gan, de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner’, and Silben-, focused
primarily on the selectionu of thue lag lengtlu. Because
these studies held the pohymuonuial degnee fixed, how-
“Corrigandid not report t-statistics or standard errors for the summed
coefficients. Assuming that fhe estimated coefficients are uncorre-
lated, one obtains a t-statisticof 3.01 for testing the hypothesis that
the IE = 0 and a t-statistic of 9.46 for testing that IT = 0. Both of
those are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
“The restrictions forced the estimated parameters of each distributed
lag to lie on a second degree polynomial.
“Meyer and Rasche (1980), p. 59. McCallum (1986), p. 14, simply
notes that if there is a fiscal policy measure that carries a strongly
significant sum ofcoefficients in an equation of the St. Louis form, its
existence has not been well publicized.”
“Specifically, if the lag length istoo long or the polynomial degree too
high, estimated parameters are unbiased but inefficient. Alterna-
tively, it the lag length is too short or the polynomial degree is too
low, the estimates are biased, Therefore, it is important that the
appropriate lag length and polynomial degree be determined. The
parameters will also be biased if the chosen lag is too long and
exceeds the true lag by more than the true polynomial degree and
may be biased even if it exceeds the true lag by an amount less than
or equal to the true polynomial degree. See Batten and Thornton
(1983) for a discussion of this and other issues, and for other
references.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1968 S
ever, they did not analyze completely the r-estrictionus
imposed by the A—J specificationu1’
When Elliot (1975) examined the lag structure and
the polynomial r-estr-ictions separately, he coruchuded
that A—i nesults were not par-ticuharly serusitive to lag
structur-e on- to the polynomial restrictions. His con-
clusionu,huoweven, was riot luased on statistical tests. He
nuen-ely conupar-ed pan-ameter estinuates for- differenit
hag stn-uctures amid po~nomialdegrees. More recently,
Batten and Thor-ntomu (1983) per-formed a systematic
examination of the specification of the A-i eqination
using n-ecent data, and Batten and Thon-nton 11985)
perfor-rned a similar’ analysis using the original A-i
data. ‘h’hey concluded that the pohicy-rehevarut restnhts
of A-i do not depend on thueir choice of hag length or
Iuolynonuiah degree.
7
Leonall C. Andersen’s best known and nuost signifi-
cant contribution to economics is his collaborative
resear-ch with Jerry L. ion-dan, which resulted iru puhuli—
cation of the A-J equation. For a per-iod of neanly 20
yean-s, it has been the suhuject of nuuch inter-est arud
considerable criticism.’ Few other- pieces of applied
economics, if any, have been so thuon’oughuly discussed,
analyzed and investigated.
Our- review of thue original Aruder-senu—ior-dan sttndv
arud thue cn-iticisrn thuat emerged following its publica-
tion points out the obvious, but seldoruu articulated,
fart that all of the criticisms of Aruder-semu arid ion-danu’s
work apply equally well to much of thue applied eco—
nonuuic researchu ofthat tinuue, and even today. We also
ruote that Ander-sen and iordaru were aware of many of
tine caveats oftheir won-kand took pr-ecautions against
them. Most imuupor-tanthy, using threim’ origirual data, we
tested the Andersenu—bondanu equatioru for nuisspecifica—
tion and simultaneous—equatiomu bias. We finud that
none of the oft-cited cniticisnus of their equationu is (or
could buave tueeru) suhustanitiated by these statistical
tests. Gr-anted, sonue of the techniques used wer-e
‘After the polynomial degree has been chosen, alternative lag speci-
fications amount to imposing polynomial restrictions on different
parameter spaces. Consequently, the restrictions implied by differ-
ent lag specifications are not nested within each other when the
polynomial degree is fixed.
“One on the most recent additions no this literature, Ral and Siklos
(1986), applies spectral analysis to the Andersen-Jordan equation
forthe period 1/1947 to(v/I 984. Again the results are consistentwith
those of A-J.
unkruown or unavailable whueri Anuderseru anti iordan’s
critics were most vocal. Fur-ther-nuore, sonic of the
criticisms an-c valid when applied to sample Iuen’iods
beyond that exannirued by Anudersen arid ion-dan:’
These facts notwithstanding, this review vindicates
Andersen and ion-dan of anuy serious breachu of the
standarils of econoruietr-ic pr-actice arid suggests that,
in reality, it was riot their- application of ecomuomnetr-ic
methuods that was controversial, but their n-esultss’
Andersen arid ion-dan should be corugn’atulated for’
providing one of the ruuost stable, hasting and robust
equations mu applied econionuuics. In our opinion, how-
ever’, tlueir’ most iruupom-tant conutrnbutioru is that they
shtook the foundations of coruveritional econonuic
thought and subjected the r-esults of starudaril applied
econonuics to closer scrutiny. This forced econuonuists
and policynuiaker-s tn take a closer hook at the issue of
the efficacyof monetary and fiscal pohic.
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